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Foreword
This paper was commissioned as part of the research effort that led to the
publication of the Economic Council's 28th Annual Review, A Joint Venture.
The Review assessed the nature of the economic linkages among the provinces
and discussed various aspects of policy harmonization within the union. It also
investigated the fiscal relationships between the provinces and the federal
government and debated key issues such as the appropriateness of national
standards, the allocation of powers between levels of government and the
problems created by overlapping jurisdictions. The last part of the Review was
devoted to a qualitative and quantitative assessment of some of the costs and
benefits attached to various political models that could emerge from the current
constitutional debate. Issues relating to the transition phases towards a new
form of confederation were also discussed including the thorny issue of how the
existing federal debt might be redistributed in the event that Quebec becomes
a sovereign nation while maintaining a common market and monetary union
with Canada.
In this paper, which served as a background to the section on transition costs,
Pat Grady points out that the redistribution of debt, unlike some other aspects
of possible constitutional change, would be at best a "zero sum" game with any
gains experienced by one party coming at the expense oflosses experienced by
others.
Redistribution of the debt means dividing up both assets and liabilities. As
the study points out, however, there is a wide variety of possible approaches to
determining what an "appropriate" share might be. Choosing among them
would require painful choices that are bound to generate some degree of
acrimony, since many of these would result in significant changes in the burden
of debt servicing costs borne by residents of each province.
Moreover, any dividing-up of assets or liabilities would need to be preceded
by an assessment of the value of particular assets and liabilities. This would be
one of the largest valuation exercises ever undertaken and the costs involved
would probably be substantial. Furthermore, any redistribution of the debt
would make it more difficult to service because indi vidual provinces could not
expect to borrow at rates of interest that are as favourable as those currently paid
by the federal government.
The paper also points to additional transition costs in the form of the likel y
negative reaction of financial markets to the increased uncertainty surrounding
major constitutional changes and the implication of debt redistribution for the
credit-worthiness of each province. While there exist various ways to minimize
vii
such costs, the author stresses that this would be possible only if excessive
acrimony is avoided.
Pat Grady has written several papers on the economic issues surrounding
constitutional change, including a recent study published by the Fraser Insti-
tute, The Economic Consequences of Quebec Sovereignty. He is a partner in
Global Economics Ltd., an economic consulting firm based in Ottawa.
Judith Maxwell
Chairman
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Introduction
Net public debt was forecast by the Minister of Finance in his 1991 budget to
increase to $419 billion by the end of the current fiscal year or almost 60 per
cent of GDP. This amounts to over $15.500 for every man, woman, and child
in Canada. Interest charges alone on the public debt are expected to be over
$43 billion in 1991-92. The public debt has become a very heavy burden for
Canadian taxpayers. Sharing the debt would be an important and contentious
issue in any new constitutional arrangements that did not preserve the fed-
eral structure of Canada.
The Economic Council staff asked me to analyse the sharing of the na-
tional debt under five specific options for new constitutional arrangements.
In two of these options for modernized federalism and decentralized federal-
ism, the issue of dividing up the public debt does not arise as Canada retains
a federal government to carry the debt. This leaves three options under which
the issue of the distribution of the federal debt would have to be addressed .
.They are:
- A sovereignty-association Quebec-Canada - where an economic and
monetary union is agreed upon and the debt and assets are divided up in a
harmonious context
- Quebec independence - where Quebec adopts its own currency, and debt
and assets have to be divided up in a climate of conflict.
- A confederation of regions (Quebec, Ontario, Atlantic Canada, Manitoba!
Saskatchewan, Alberta. and British Columbia) - where each region has to
assume its portion of the debt and where tax collection is the exclusive re-
sponsibility of the regions.
This paper explores the implications for the division of the national debt of
these three options and their underlying assumptions. It should be empha-
sized that these options and assumptions are not my own and that I take no
responsibility for their political viability. Indeed, my own view is that the
only two options that are politically viable are renewed federalism or Quebec
independence. Both sovereignty-association and a confederation of regions
are non-starters from a political point of view.'
Under any of these three hypothetical options, the sharing of the federal
debt would be one of the most difficult issues to be resolved. The negotia-
tions over the federal debt would be at best a zero-sum game. What one party
would gain by obtaining a reduced share of the debt, the others would lose
through increased shares. This is unlike negotiations over trade where all par-
ties to the negotiations can be gainers.
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Indeed it is possible that the division of the debt could be a negative-sum
game. The increased variability of the revenues of the pieces of a divided
Canada would be greater than that of the whole and could thus give rise to a
premium in borrowing rates and raise the total public debt charges. But, even
with higher public debt charges in total, some regions could experience lower
public debt charges if their debt burden were to decrease.
Any negotiations over the sharing of the federal debt would obviously be
more difficult if carried out in a climate of conflict It would thus be much
harder to achieve an agreement in the event of Quebec independence than
under a Quebec-Canada sovereignty-association arrangement assuming, of
course, that it were possible to negotiate such an agreement at all. Under
scvereignry-assoclation, it is assumed that the mutual interest in preserving
close economic relations would temper the negotiations and allow for mutually
beneficial trade-offs.
The federal debt has been called the "bonds that tie" because of the sense
of shared interest it imparts to discussions of Canada's constitutional future.
It could equally be called the "bonds that break" because of the incentive it
creates for parties to separate from the federation to avoid their share of the
debt.
In this paper, the public accounts presentation of the comparative state-
ment of financial assets and liabilities of the federal government is provided ..
Some of the possible approaches for the division of the debt are explored.
Included is the proposal of the Secretariat of the Commission on the Political
and Constitutional Future of Quebec. The rationales of the various approaches
are considered. Any resulting problems are discussed. Finally, some mecha-
nisms which could minimize the transition costs of the debt and asset transfer
are reviewed.
The Financial Assets and Liabilities of the
Federal Government
The federal government's financial assets and liabilities as of March 31,
1990,which would have to be shared under any of the non-federal constitu-
tional options, are shown in Table 1. The figures are taken from the Public
Accounts of Canada for the latest period currently available.'
On the asset side of the federal government's balance sheet, the value of
the federal government's investment in enterprise crown corporations such as
CMHC, the Farm Credit Corporation. Canadian National Railways, and Petro-
Canada was $17.7 billion after allowance is made for any reduction in the
value of the government's investment. The value of other loans, investment,
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Table 1
Government or Canada Public Accounts Presentation
Comparative Statement of Financial Assets and Liabilities for the
Year Ended M arch 31. 1990
($ millions)
Financial Assets
Loans, investments. and advances
Enterprise crown corporations
Less: allowance for valuation
Other
Less: allowance for valuation
21.977
4.300
17.677
9,208
6.200
3.008
20.685Total, net loans. investments. and advances
Foreign exchange accounts
International reserves held in the exchange fund account
International Monetary Fund - Subscriptions
Less: Intemational Monetary Fund - Notes payable and
special drawing rights allocations
Total net foreign exchange accounts
Accounts receivable
Cash in transit
Cash
15.393
4.474
Total financial assets
Accumulated deficit
Total
5.045
14.822
14.822
2.320
Jdll
41,475
357.961
399,436
Liabilities
Specified purpose accounts
Canada Pension Fund account (net)
Superannuation accounts (net)
Govenunent annuities account
Deposit and trust accounts .
Provincial tax collection accounts
Other
Total specified-purpose accounts
Other liabilities
Unmatured debt
Payable in Canadian currency
Payable in foreign currencies
Total unmatured debt
Total
2.962
70.997
907
1.156
1.398
~
78.340
26.534
288.887
5.675
294,562
399,436
SoURCB Government of Canada, Public AccolUlls ofCaMdiJ. Vohune L Summary Report
and Financial Staterncnu (Ou.awa: Minister of Supply aDd Services Canada, 1990).
p.1.9.
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and advances, which includes loans to developing countries and international
organizations. was $3 billion after allowance for valuation. The value of the
foreign exchange account including IMF subscriptions was $14.8 billion. The
value of accounts receivable, cash in transit, and cash was, respectively, $14.8
billion, $2.3 billion, and $1.5 billion. The value of total financial assets, which
would have to be shared, was $41.5 billion.
The federal government also owns nonfmancial assets, the most important
of which is real property. These nonfinancial assets are recorded in the public
accounts at $1 and are consequently not shown. No recent estimate of the
value of these assets is available. The Task Force on Program Review esti-
mated that the value of federal real property holdings was between $40 and
$60 billion in 1984.3 These assets would also have to be shared in the event
of a break-up.
The accumulated deficit is the difference between fmancial assets and liabi-
·lities. It represents the total value of budgetary deficits since Confederation .
.It measures the net debt that would have to be shared.
On the liability side of the federal government's balance sheet, the specified-
purpose accounts, which include amounts owing to several internal govern-
ment accounts including, most notably, the Superannuation accounts, were
valued at $78.3 billion. The Superannuation accounts alone represent $71 bil-
lion of this, not allowing for any actuarial deficiency that might exist in the
accounts.
The other liabilities, which encompass interest and matured debt, accounts
payable, outstanding checks and warrants, and allowances for borrowings of
agent enterprise crown corporations expected to be repaid by the government,
were $26.5 billion.
The fmal category of liability is urunatured debt, which was valued at $294.6
billion (Table 2). Marketable bonds account for 43.3 per cent of unmatured
debt, Treasury bills for 40.2 per cent, and Canada Savings Bonds for 13.9
per cent, It also includes special nonmarketable bonds issued to the Canada
Pension Plan Investment Fund, and foreign currency obligations. The uruna-
tured debt is what most people have in mind when they talk about public
debt, although it amounts to less than three quarters of federal government
liabilities.
It would also be necessary to take into account the assets and liabilities of
the Bank of Canada in determining the sharing of assets and liabilities. The
total assets and liabilities of the Bank of Canada as of March 31,1990 were
$22.6 billion. The main assets of the bank were $21.5 billion in government of
Canada direct and guaranteed securities, and the main liabilities were $19.6
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Table 2
Government or Canada Unmatured Debt, ror the Year Ended
March 31,1990
(S millions)
Payable In Canadian Currency
Marketable bonds
Canada Savings Bonds
Special nonmarketable bonds issued to the
Canada Pension Plan Investment Fund
Treasury bills
127.682
40.929
Less: government's holdings of unmatured debt
3.072
118.550
290.233
1.346
288.887
Payable In Foreign Currencies
Marketable bonds
Notes and loans
Canada bills
Total unmatured debt
4.128
177
1.446
5.751
~
5.675
294.562
Less: government's holdings of unmatured debt
SoU\ICR Government of Canada. Pwblii: AccolUlt.r of CaNJda. p. 2.9.
billion in notes in circulation and $2.3 billion in Canadian dollar deposits.
The Bank of Canada is very important in any sharing of federal government
assets and liabilities. since it holds so much government debt and since its
liabilities bear no interest, Under a monetary union. the holders of the bank' s
liabilities are in effect indirectly holding the federal government debt directly
held by the Bank of Canada. This must be included in the federal debt hold-
ings of the appropriate regions or else their direct and indirect federal debt
holdings would be underestimated.
Approaches to the Sharing of Assets and Debt
The Implications of International Law
The first question that has 10 be asked about the sharing of assets and debt
is whether there is a unique approach sanctioned by international law. The
short answer is that there is no such approach and virtually any sharing agreed
10 by the parties would be compatible with international law.'
The Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of State
Property, Archives and Debts. 1983. was an effort 10 codify and extend the
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customary law in this area. As the Vienna Convention has not been ratified
by any state, and most western COWl tries are opposed to it for a number of
reasons, the Vienna Convention has no official status except to the extent
that it reflects customary law. Furthermore, the Vienna Convention is only
intended to apply to the effects of a succession of states that takes place in
conformity with international law and, more particularly, the principle of in-
ternational law in the Charter of the United Nations. This requires that the
secession correspond to the wishes of the population of the seceding state
and that it take place with the consent of the dismembered state. In addition,
there is no precedent of a member of a federal state seceding from the fed-
eration that could be applied. International law thus provides no firm guid-
ance on the distribution of assets and liabilities in the event of the break-up
of a country such as Canada. Any split that would be acceptable to the parties
would be compatible with international law . No specific approach can be said
to have the unique sanction of international law in its favour.
Top Down or Bottom Up?
The successor states would have to agree on the approaches and principles
that would govern the division of assets and liabilities. Two fundamental ap-
proaches would be possible. The first would be a top-down approach that
would seek to establish agreement on the shares of total debt net of financial
and nonfmancial assets, and would then distribute the specific assets and lia-
bilities in such a way as to end with the agreed-upon net debt The residual in
the calculation that would assure that the agreed-upon global share was
achieved would be debt outstanding. To the extent that the share of specific
assets and liabilities allocated was greater or lesser than the agreed-upon glo-
bal share, a greater or lesser share as appropriate of outstanding debt would
have to be assumed.
The second approach would be to agree upon the sharing of each particu-
lar category of assets and liabilities based on principles most relevant to the
specific category and to let the global shares turn out as they would. The
approach proposed by the Secretariat of the Commission on the Political and
Constitutional Future of Quebec exhibits some features of this second sort.
The first type of approach has the advantage of being more equitable as it
establishes an agreed-upon overriding distributional criterion that governs the
sharing of assets and liabilities. The overall result is thus less influenced by
the historical accident of the existing territorial distribution of assets and lia-
bilities. However, the territorial distribution would be an important determi-
nant of the subsequent ownership of specific assets, especially nonfinancial
assets.
Either approach would require that all assets and liabilities be appraised so
that their current market value could be determined. For certain assets such
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as real property, there are sophisticated appraisal methodologies that have
been developed and that could be applied. But any changes in property val-
ues that would be associated with the different constitutional options would
certainly complicate the task and would raise the issue of whether pre- or
post-break-up prices should be used in appraising property values. For some
assets such as gold, there are active markets. The value of indexed pension
liabilities would have to be determined using actuarial techniques. Other assets
and liabilities would present their own valuation problems. The valuation of
federal assets and liabilities would be one of the largest valuation exercises
that has ever occurred. It would require large numbers of accountants and
evaluators, and the resolution of many difficult evaluation issues. Needless
to say, it would be very costly. But it would have to be done in order to ar-
rive at a fair sharing of assets and liabilities.
Principles of Sharing
Before turning to some of the specific indicators that could be used in con-
structing formulas for dividing up the debt, it is useful to consider some of
the basic principles that might provide guidance. In public finance. the two
main principles of taxation are ability to pay and benefit If the public debt is
considered to be deferred taxes, then the same principles should be applicable
to the-division of the debt
The ability-to-pay principle suggests that the amount of debt assumed should
be directly related to income, because income is the best measure of a country
or province's ability to pay debt service charges. Empirical measures of abil-
ity to pay are GDP, tax revenue, or fiscal capacity. As ability to pay depends
upon current and future income, it would be important that the indicators of
ability to pay used in dividing up the debt be forward-looking. If ability to
pay is the principle behind the sharing of the public debt, it indicates a will-
ingness to continue to redistribute income from high-income regions to lower-
income regions.
The benefit principle suggests that the amount of debt assumed should be
related to the net fiscal benefits derived from federal government spending
and taxing. Since the public debt was incurred to finance past net fiscal ben-
efits, the indicators of net fiscal benefits would have to be backward-looking
and would have to identify which regions benefited from past federal gov-
ernment spending in excess of the taxes paid Under the benefit principle the
division of the debt could be regarded as a final settling of accounts.
A third principle which does not find much favour in public finance is equal-
ity. While head taxes under which everyone pays an equal tax are generally
agreed to be efficient, they are not considered to be equitable. But, as a
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fundamental philosophical or ethical principle, equality is much better ac-
cepted. Children are taught that fairness requires all to share equally. The
equivalent principle for dividing the debt would be per capita sharing or shar-
ing by population. This has the advantage of being simple and is deeply rooted
in the human concept of fairness. It would imply the end of the redistribution
among regions resulting from the current financing of the public debt based
on ability to pay. But it would not go so far as to settle all past accounts, as
would be required under the benefit principle.
Various Distributional Formulas and Their Pros and Cons
There are various formulas that could be used to determine the sharing of
the debt and that would have their basis in one of the above principles. The
two most basic were identified by Jacques Parizeau, the Leader of the Parti
. Quebecois, in a speech in Toronto last year, when he said "There are really
two criteria to use: population and Gross Domestic Product" This is in ef-
. feet based on either the equality principle or ability to pay. He went on to say
"We will, I suppose, haggle for a few weeks before we come to something
like a quarter."! Would that it were so simple. More recently, the Secretariat
of the Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec has
come up with a more complicated proposal for sharing assets and liabilities
that is not based on any single principle and that results in a much lower
share for Quebec, which will be considered in the next section.
The regional distribution of various economic indicators in 1989, which
could be used to operationalize the principles for the sharing of assets and
liabilities, is provided in Table 3. The first indicator is public debt charges. It
would not be a good indicator to use for dividing up the debt, not being based
on any principle. Rather, it shows where the debt is currently held based on
the voluntary portfolio decisions of Canadian investors. The high proportion
of the debt held in Ontario and the lower proportion in the other regions are
notable. Ontario is where most of the financial institutions that hold Cana-
dian government debt are located.
Population is the next indicator, which can be justified based on the equality
principle. In 1989, 25.5 per cent of the Canadian population was in Quebec,
8.8 per cent in the Atlantic provinces. 36.5 per cent in Ontario, 8 per cent in
Manitoba/$aska1chewan, 92 per cent in Alberta, and 11.6 per cent in British
Columbia. These same proportions could be applied to assets and liabilities
to determine the shares to be transferred to the different regions. The rationale
for using population for sharing the assets and liabilities of the federal gov-
ernment would be the equality principle, namely that each Canadian is equal
and has an equal share in the country and thus should share equally in the
division of the assets and liabilities. In my view, this would be the simplest
FTable 3 {HA n-~
Regional Distribution or Various Economic Indicators in 1989
Manitoba! British Canada
Atlantic Quebec Ontario Saskatchewan Alberta Columbia (excl. Quebec)
(Per cent of total)
Public debt charges 4.9 17.4 ''I.v 60.7 4.1 4.5 7.9 82.6 fl
Population 8.8 25-;5 ~ b', 3 36.5 8.0 9.2 11.6 74.5 ?~'?
GDP 6.0 23.3 2~.q 41.9 6.6 10.2 11.1 76.7 7?./
Revenue 6.0 21.6 ,,)./.~ 46.6 5.4 9.1 10.7 78.4 ?r,C
Revenue adjusted 1- 6.8 21.0 44.5 6.3 9.9 11.4 79.0
Revenue adjusted 2b 6.7 22.2 JI.4 43.5 6.2 9.7 11.2 77.8
Revenue adjusted 3c 3.5 22.8 49.4 4.8 10.2 11.9 77.2
Federal capital consumption
allowances 15.1 18.7 33.4 10.6 7.0 9.4 813
Federal investment cumulative'[ 15.9 .a7,1'1·"13 30.6 11.8 7.0 10.7 81.3
Federal net lending cumulativtf 47.2 30.91'j.,QI..7 -7.5 19.9 -13.4 2.2 69.1
NOTB Shares do not add up to 100 per cent because revenues and expenditures in the territories and abroad are excluded.
I Total federal revenue with indirect taxes distributed as consumer expenditures instead of production.
b A. above but with federal revenue in Quebec increased by $1,931.5 million to reflect 16.5 per cent Quebec abatemenL
c A. above but net of federal transfen to provinces.
d Government investment deflated by the price deflator for government investment is cumulated from 1961 to 1989.
e Federal net lending is cumulated from 1961 to 1989. The sum of the regions is less than 100 per cent because the territories Ire excluded IS is federal net lending
abroad. ---
SoURa AU data except for population Ire based on data from Statistics Canada, System of National Accounts, Provincial Economic ACCOIUl/s, annual estimates
1985·89, CaL 10·299.
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way to split the debt and would be most understandable by all Canadians. It
would thus be the way that would most likely be judged fairest by Canadians.
Even Jacques Parizeau's musings about a quarter share seem to support this
indicator.
The second indicator is GDP, which is based on the ability-to-pay princi-
ple. It has the advantage of reflecting the economic base of the region and
hence the region's capacity to carry debt If GDP were used as the criteria.
the debt-to-GDP ratios of all regions would be equal to the sum of the debt-
to-GDP ratio of the federal and provincial governments prior to the division
of the federal debt In this sense, all regions would continue to have the same
debt-to-GDP ratio as before the division of the debt.
-The next set of criteria shown in Table 3 are also based on the ability-to-
pay principle and related to the distribution of revenue from the Provincial
Economic Accounts. The justification for using revenue is that it is a better
indicator of a region's ability to carry debt than GDP (an even better indicator
would be fiscal capacity as defmed for purposes of the equalization program).
Revenue from a region also provides an estimate of the region's future con-
tribution to the federal government if Confederation were to continue.
There are two reasons that could be advanced for using federal revenues as
a criteria for sharing assets and liabilities. First, the debt was incurred on the
implicit assumption that all regions would continue to provide the same rev-
enues to the federal government. Second, the fiscal position of a particular
region should be the same whether it remains in Confederation or withdraws.
This argument is more convincing, however, in the case of a region that re-
mains in Confederation. It clearly would not be fair for a well-off region to
withdraw from Confederation, leaving the less well-off regions involuntarily
saddled with the federal debt. But a region that decides to withdraw is making
a voluntary choice and should be prepared to live with the consequences.
There are several different ways of looking at revenue. There is total rev-
enue and there are a number of possible adjustments that could be made to
total revenue. The first adjustment is to distribute indirect taxes among the
provinces based on consumption instead of production, as suggested by the
currently accepted theory of the incidence of indirect taxes," This reduces the
revenue shares of Quebec and especially Ontario, where most of Canada's
manufacturing production is concentrated. The second adjustment is to in-
crease Quebec's revenues to reflect the special 16.5-per-cent Quebec tax abate-
ment. This represents tax points that were transferred to Quebec for opting
out of certain federal programs for which other provinces receive federal trans-
fer payments.
The third adjusted revenue series is adjusted for federal fiscal transfers in
addition to the adjustments for indirect taxes and the Quebec tax abatement.
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It is calculated by subtracting federal transfers to provincial governments from
the second adjusted revenue series. It represents the net contribution of a re-
gion to the federal government This is the amount that the regions' citizens
would be providing to the federal government to finance its activities includ-
ing the payment of interest on the public debt if the regions were to remain in
Confederation. The Atlantic provinces and Manitoba/Saskatchewan have
much smaller shares of net revenues because of the importance of federal
transfer payments that they receive. Interestingly, Quebec's share increases
slightly under this criterion, even though it is an equalization receiving prov-
ince.
The next two indicators are federal government capital consumption al-
Iowances and cumulative investment spending from 1961 to 1989. They are
not based on any of the basic principles enunciated above, but rather provide
two different rough estimates of the shares of the different regions in federal
nonfinancial assets. They would not be reliable enough to use in assessing
the value of assets in particular regions for the purpose of valuing asset trans-
fers. Instead, a comprehensive exercise, which would seek to establish a mar-
ket value for each individual asset, would be required.
The final indicator, which is based on the benefit principle, is cumulative
federal net lending over the 1961-89 period. The starting year, 1961, was cho-
sen because the provincial accounts data are not available for earlier years.
Federal net lending is the Provincial Economic Accounts equivalent of the
federal deficit Cumulating it over time shows the proportion of the cumula-
tive federal deficit that was run over this period that can be attributed to each
region. As the gross debt was relatively small in 1961 (only $20.1 billion),
the cumulative federal deficit in a region over the period, which represents
the debt incurred on each region's behalf by the federal government, can be
viewed as a good proxy for the region's share of federal debt at the end of
the period. The regions that received more from than they paid to the federal
government over this period, such as the Atlantic provinces, Quebec, Manitoba!
Saskatchewan, and British Columbia. have a positive share. The regions that
paid more in than they received, such as Ontario and Alberta, have a negative
share. This criterion could be viewed as an exit tax on leaving the federation.
Provinces would be required to settle their past balances of benefits or con-
tributions.'
Shares of Net Public Debt and Public Debt Charges Estimated
Using the Various Distributional Formulas
A better appreciation of the implications of some of the various distribu-
tional formulas can be gained by applying them to net debt (gross debt minus
fmancial assets) and debt charges as projected in this year's budget for the
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current fiscal year. Net debt is forecast to reach $419 billion by March 31,
1992, and public debt charges are forecast to be $43.2 billion in the 1991-92
fiscal year. The estimates of the public debt shares shown in Table 4 are of-
fered to provide an indication of the possible orders of magnitude of the debt
that would have to be assumed by the various regions under different distribu-
tional formulas, They should not be taken as definitive estimates of relative
debt shares. The preparation of such estimates would require, among other
things, that all assets and liabilities be evaluated including nonfinancial assets,
the allocation of specific assets be determined, and any settlement balances
resulting from the asset transfer be taken into account,
Under any of the three non-federal constitutional options of sovereignty-
association, Quebec independence, or a confederation of regions, the debt
would have to be shared between Quebec and the rest of Canada. IT population
was used as a criteria, Quebec's share of net debt would be $106.9 billion
and the rest of Canada's share $312.1 billion. An implication of using popu-
lation as a criterion is that Quebec would assume a larger portion of debt in
relation to GOP than the rest of the country because its GOP per capita is
lower. Quebec's share of the debt would be reduced to $97.4 billion if GOP
was used as the criteria and $93 billion if adjusted revenue was used. The
rest of Canada's share of the net debt would go up to $321.6 billion and $326
billion. On the other hand, if cumulative net lending was used, the Quebec
share would rise to $129.4 billion and the rest of Canada's share would drop
to $289.6 billion. The amount at stake between the lowest and highest esti-
mate of Quebec's share would be $36 billion. Quebec's share of the federal
debt as a proportion of GOP would run between 58.1 and SO.S per cent of
Quebec's GOP. This would make the difference between a significant de-
crease in the debt burden of Quebecers and a large increase if the debt-to-
GOP ratio of a sovereign Quebec were compared to the current sum of the
federal and provincial debt-to-GOP ratio. Associated with this increase in net
debt would be an increase in public debt charges for Quebec that would range
between $9.6 and $13.3 billion. The rest of Canada's share of federal debt as
a percentage of GOP would range between 54.2 and 61 per cent or between a
significant decrease and a slight increase.
Under the confederation-of-regions option, the debt would have to be shared
by the six regions. Using the population criterion, the Atlantic provinces would
assume $36.8 billion of the net debt, Ontario $153 billion, Manitoba!
Saskatchewan $33.4 billion, Alberta $38.7 billion, and British Columbia $4S.S
billion. Using the GOP or adjusted revenue criteria, the shares of the less
well-off regions of the country (the Atlantic provinces, Quebec, and Manitoba!
Saskatchewan) would be lower and the better-off regions (Ontario, Alberta,
and British Columbia) would be higher. Using the cumulative net lending
criteria would increase the shares of the less well-off regions and reduce the
shares of the well-off regions, even going so far as to transform those of
~Table 4
Regional Distribution of Projected Net Public Debt and Public Debt Charges Using Various Criteria in 1991·92
Manitoba! British Canada
Atlantic Quebec Ontario Saskatchewan Alberta Columbia (excl. Quebec)
(Billions of dollars)
Public debt
Population 36.8 106.9 153.1 33.4 38.7 48.8 312.1
GDP 25.0 97.4 175.4 27.7 42.6 49.0 321.6
Revenue adjusted 2 27.9 93.0 182.2 25.9 40.4 47.0 326.0
Net lending cumulative 198.0 129.4 -31.5 83.5 -56.0 9.3 289.6
Public debt
(Per cent of GDP)
Population 87.0 66.7 53.0 73.4 53.3 59.1 58.4 i
GDP 59.1 60.8 60.8 60.7 58.7 59.4 60.1 Z
Revenue adjusted 2 66.0 58.1 63.1 56.9 55.7 56.9 61.0 n~
Net lending cumulative 467.7 80.8 -10.9 188.8 -77.2 11.3 54.2 o
(Billions of dollars) ~
Public debt charges a.a
Population 3.8 11.0 15.8 3.4 4.0 5.0 32.2 e.§
GDP 2.6 10.0 18.1 2.9 4.4 5.1 33.2 e.
Revenue adjusted 2 2.9 9.6 18.8 2.7 4.2 4.8 33.6 ~Net lending cumulative 20.4 13.3 -3.2 8.6 -5.8 1.0 29.9 §
00
NOTB The total net public debt and public debt charges estimated for 1991-92 to be distributed among the regions are $419 billion and $43.2 billion, respectively, ~
and are taken from Departmentof Finance, TMBudget, Febroary 26,1991, p. 94. Regional GDP for 1991 used in calculating debt as a percentage of GDP was g
estimated by applying the forecast regional growth rates from the Conference Board's January 23, 1991 forecast to 1989 levels from the Provincial Economic r;;
AccoU/l/s. -~
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Ontario and especially Alberta into cash transfers. Indeed, using this criteria
would produce a debt burden as measured by the debt-to-GDP ratio inManitoba/
Saskatchewan and especially the Atlantic provinces that could only be
described as crushing. But this is, of course. purely academic as neither
Manitoba/Saskatchewan nor the Atlantic provinces have embarked upon a
process that could lead to a referendum on sovereignty. The share of public
debt charges would vary with the share of the debt assumed.
The federal debt assumed under any of these options would come on top
of the existing provincial debt. A region's ability to handle the new debt re-
sulting from the division of the federal debt would depend on how heavily
indebted the region already was. In 1989, the most deeply in-debt region was
Manitoba/Saskatchewan, where provincial-local public debt charges ac-
counted for 6.3 per cent of GDP, followed in decreasing order of indebtedness
by the Atlantic region (4.9 per cent), Quebec (4 per cent), Alberta (3.2 per
cent), British Columbia (2.6 per cent), and Ontario (2.1 per cent). This rank-
ing, which corresponds closely with the ranking of ratings accorded to the
provinces in the regions by the credit rating agencies, will obviously change
over time as some provinces begin to run larger relative deficits than others.
In particular, Ontario will likely move up in the indebtedness order in coming
years if the projections for large deficits in the 1991 budget are realized. For
the present. however t Quebec is more heavily indebted than the rest of Canada
where, in 1989, provincial-local public debt charges amounted to only 2.9 per
cent of GDP. This would make it more difficult for Quebec to bear its share
of the debt than for the rest of Canada.
A final word of warning is in order. Any distribution of the federal debt
burden among regions would make it more difficult to service the public debt.
Federal revenues from all regions are much more stable than federal revenues
for anyone region because economic cycles vary across regions. Federal rev-
enues may be weak in the Atlantic provinces if the fishery is having a bad
year, in Ontario if auto sales are down, in Manitoba/Saskatchewan if grain
prices or the price of oil are low, or in British Columbia if the forest industry
is in recession, but it is an unusually unfortunate year when all regions are in
the doldrums at the same time. This interregional risk pooling provides the
federal government with a more dependable source of revenue and makes it
easier for the federal government to service the public debt, This greater ability
to carry debt is recognized by lenders and credit rating agencies and results
in the federal government's AAA credit rating and lower risk premiums in
interest rates in spite of the federal government's heavy debt load. Any divi-
sion of the debt among regions would lose this advantage and would result in
higher risk premiums in interest rates, particularly for the more volatile and
heavily indebted regional economies that would be less able to bear the addi-
tional debt burden.
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The Proposal 0/ the Commission on the Political and
Constitutional Future o/Quebec
The Secretariat of the Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future
of Quebec proposed the sharing of assets and liabilities shown in Table 5.1
This was based on an eclectic approach that claimed to set the share of fed-
eral non-pension fmancialliabilities that would be assumed by Quebec equal
to its share of total federal assets. It is worth noting before proceeding that
there is no logical reason why the sharing of the public debt should be based
on the sharing of assets, given that the public debt was not incurred to pur-
chase assets but rather for deficit spending.
. The share of assets in turn was based on several different criteria. The
3.S·per.cent estimated share of financial assets shown in the table was based
on an estimate of the share of these assets accounted for by enterprise crown
corporations operating in Quebec, or Quebec's share of crown corporations
which it would want to retain. It was assumed that Quebec would renounce
its interest in all other financial assets, thus lowering its share. The share of
nonflnancial assets, which is mostly real property, was estimated using in-
formation on the distribution of federal payments to municipalities in lieu of
taxes.
Table 5
Quebec's Share of Federal Assets and Liabilities Proposed by the
Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec
Value Part of Quebec
($ millions) (percent) ($ millions)
Assets
Financial assets 57,195 3.8 2,169
Nonfinancial assets 72,000 18.0 12.960
Total assets 129,195 11.7 15,129
Accumulated deficit 200,394 22.8 45,690
Total 329,589 18.5 60,819
LlabUltles
Monetary liabilities 22,486
Financial liabilities 307,103 18.5 56,814
Pension liabilities 70,997 133 9,456
SoURCII Commiuioo 011 the Political and Calltitutional Future of Quebec, EJll'MfIlS d' aM·
lyse iCOf/.OmiquepertinefllS d ill rivisioft dMstauu poIiliq.u et colIStilllliOflMl du
Qui~c, OiJcussioo paper no. I, tint semester. 1991. pp. 427,431 .nd 433. The
figures in this table incorporate several adjustments made by the Secretariat of the
Canmissioo that mue them different from those shown in Tables 1 and 2.
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The final category on the asset side of the balance sheet that is considered
is not really an asset category like the others. It is the accumulated deficit
which is defined to be equal to the difference between non-pension liabilities
and total assets. The Secretariat proposed that it should be shared, based on
Quebec's average share of federal revenues between 1972 and 1988, taking
into account the special Quebec tax abatement not allowed the other prov-
inces. Thus the 22.8-per-cent share was estimated. The rationale for using
Quebec's share of revenues to determine the distribution of the accumulated
deficit is that the accumulated deficit represents future tax liabilities and Que-
bec's share should be equal to Quebec's share of future federal taxes whether
or not Quebec remains part of Canada.
Under the proposal, Quebec's share of non-pension financial liabilities,
which is by far the most important category of debt, would be determined by
Quebec's proposed 18.5-per-cent share of assets. Given that it was assumed
that there would be a Canada-Quebec monetary union. Quebec's share of the
federal government's monetary liabilities (currency in circulation and deposits
with the Bank of Canada) would result from the decisions of Quebecers to
hold Canadian dollars. Finally, concerning pension liabilities, the proposal is
that Quebec assume the pension liabilities of federal employees working in
Quebec that would be transferred to the Quebec government (and not federal
government pensioners living in Quebec). This would amount to 13.3 per
cent of total federal pension liabilities.
In total, the proposal calls for Quebec to assume 17.5 per cent of the fed-
eral government's financial and pension liabilities. This is substantially less
than Quebec's share of population, GDP, or tax revenue, even taking into
account Quebec's relatively smaller share of assets. According to the Secre-
tariat's own calculations, it would result in a 5-percentage-point increase in
the debt-to-GDP ratio of the federal government from 53.5 to 58.4 per cent.
The proposal would not likely be considered equitable by the rest of Canada
if it were advanced in the context of negotiations over Quebec sovereignty.
Possible Mechanisms for
Minimizing Transition Costs
Critical to minimizing transition costs would be to carry out the debt and
asset transfer in such a way as to minimize uncertainty. If there is one thing
that lenders and financial markets abhor, it is uncertainty. Any borrowers that
take actions that increase uncertainty are bound to pay a price in terms of a
higher interest-rate premium demanded. The existing public debt is an obli-
gation of the federal government of Canada and until it matures it must re-
main so. There must never be any questions about the federal government's
readiness to meet its obligations and the security of the funds lent. From the
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beginning, it would be important to establish clearly in the eyes of all market
participants that the federal government stands firmly behind its obligations
regardless of the outcome of any constitutional negotiations. A corollary of
this is that no existing holders of govenunent of Canada debt should be forced
to convert their holdings for the debt of another political unit except in ex-
treme circumstances.
It would also be critical that any negotiations over the sharing of the debt
take place within a calm and rational context. Recriminations and threats at
the bargaining table could undermine the credibility of all governments in-
volved. This could make it more difficult to secure the fmancing and could
lead to increases in risk premiums in interest rates on government debt that
would be costly for all parties concerned.
The good credit ratings of Canada and the provinces have been earned over
years of responsible behaviour as borrowers. In the event that it becomes nec-
essary to divide the public debt, it should be done in such a way as not to
jeopardize these hard-earned credit ratings.
Quebec-Canada
Transitional costs would be much less under the Quebec-Canada
sovereignty-association option than under the Quebec independence option,
given the Economic Council's assumption that the move to sovereignty-
association would be harmonious. The preservation of a common currency
would go a long way to reassuring lenders about the security of their prin-
cipal. It would also be much easier for Quebec to assume its share of the
Canadian-dollar-denominated public debt if it were to belong to a monetary
union with Canada. Finally, the asswned more harmonious climate of rela-
tions between Quebec and Canada under sovereignty-association would help
to minimize the uncertainty stemming from the constitutional changes.
Under both the Quebec-Canada sovereignty-association or the Quebec in-
dependence options, transition problems would arise from the difficulties that
would be encountered if Quebec were to asswne its share of the debt more
rapidly than markets could be developed to absorb it. Currently, Quebec resi-
dents only hold around 17.5 per cent of the federal public debt Any share
above this would require the development of new markets, which would take
time. In addition, Quebec would have to finance annually its own budget
deficit, which would incorporate the share of the federal deficit that it would
asswne, and which could easily exceed $10 billion. If the time were not al-
lowed to develop a market for such a large stock and flow of public debt,
Quebec would be forced to pay a higher interest-rate premiwn on its debt
than otherwise.
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The potential for the development of larger debt markets in Quebec is there.
The Caisse de dipOts et placements du Quebec. which invests QPP and public-
sector pension funds in Quebec. only held half of its $36 billion portfolio in
bonds at the end of 1990. The caisses populaires also hold a relatively small
proportion of their portfolios in government bonds. Quebec also has a good
reputation as a borrower in international markets that would allow these mar-
kets to be tapped 10 a greater extent
Any transfer of debt obligations 10 Quebec could take place in accordance
with an agreed-upon timetable that would allow for the developments of debt
markets. There is no good reason 10 refinance existing outstanding debt until
it matures. This would just result in additional financing charges. The average
term 10maturity of federal public debt is now four years. A reasonable time-
table for debt transfer might involve transferring half of the debt over a four-
year period with the balance over the remainder of the decade. This would
probably allow sufficient time for the expansion of the market for govern-
ment debt in Quebec.'
The solution 10 the transition problem, where the federal government would
continue indefinitely to bear the full debt in return for a transfer from Quebec
of its share of interest costs, would be beneficial for Quebec but disadvanta-
geous for the rest of Canada. The federal government would likely be viewed
by fmancial markets as still bearing the full obligation of the debt, and the
transfer paid 10 the federal government by Quebec for its share of public debt
charges would be regarded as less secure than the federal government's pre-
vious access to the Quebec tax base. In effect. the federal government would
be providing a guarantee for Quebec debt with no offsetting compensation.
This would result in an interest premium for the federal government on all its
debt that would not be covered by the Quebec transfer of its share of the
interest costs.
Another disadvantage for the rest of Canada of continuing 10 have Quebec's
share of the public debt as a direct liability indefinitely is that it would give
Quebec a lever over the rest of Canada that could be used in subsequent ne-
gotiations over unrelated issues. Quebec could always threaten to withhold
the transfer payments for interest until whatever issue was on the table was
resolved 10 its satisfaction.
One possible solution 10 the problem of giving Quebec leverage over the
rest of Canada would be to require Quebec to issue marketable bonds 10
Canada covering its share of the debt In this case, if Quebec ever sought 10
withhold the transfer payments for interest 10 exert leverage, the Canadian
government could sell Quebec bonds on the open market, increasing the cost
of borrowing for Quebec and making it more difficult 10 borrow. However,
this would not necessarily be an effective strategy. Quebec would always have
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the fallback option of repudiating the bonds held by the rest of Canada, pro-
vided that it was possible to single out the bonds based on particular identifi-
able characteristics such as serial numbers or bond types.
Another alternative would be to have Quebec pledge assets to the federal
government as collateral for its share of the debt until it was able to assume
the debt directly itself. This would not be an easy solution as the value of the
required assets would be enormous in comparison to Quebec's share of fed-
eral government assets.
Confederation of Regions
The assumed harmonious climate of relations under a confederation of re-
gions would help to keep investors confident during the negotiations over
the distribution of assets and debt that would have to take place under this
option. The maintenance of the Canadian dollar as the common currency
would facilitate sharing the burden of the debt and avoid any currency risk
for lenders. This would all serve to minimize transition costs.
In addition, since there would still be some form of central government. it
would be possible to minimize the transition costs of splitting up the debt by
assigning the task of debt management to a confederal agency. If such an
agency were established, the regional governments would be responsible for .
transferring the funds required to pay public debt charges on their share of
the debt to the confederal agency. The regional governments would also be
required to pay the agency a management fee to cover the costs of managing
the debt. A key advantage of this option would be that it would make it un-
necessary to recall existing federal government debt and to have each regional
government issue its own debt to cover its share of the federal debt This
would eliminate the unnecessary financial costs associated with reissuing debt
There might also be some advantages from economies of scale in debt man-
agement but. in the past, provincial governments have apparently not been
convinced that the advantages of such an agency would outweigh the costs
or else they would have already established one.
Conclusion
Sharing the burden of the federal debt may be a technical issue that should
be clearly subordinate to the other broader political and economic issues
arising in the non-federal constitutional options. But because of the vast sums
of money involved and their implications for the standard of living and wel-
fare of citizens of all the regions of Canada, it would likely be one of the
most contentious questions which would have to be settled. The inherent
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adversarial character of the negotiations would be exacerbated by the emer-
gence of any acrimony amongst the parties to the negotiations. It would be
important that any negotiations be carried out in a climate of calm economic
rationality.
There are five additional ways that the transition costs of the debt and asset
transfer could be minimized. First. maintaining a common currency through
a monetary union would avoid introducing any element of exchange risk into
the financing of the debt. Second. it would be important to avoid incurring
any additional fmancial cost from redeeming existing debt only to issue new
debt. Third, the transfer of debt could be phased over a long enough period
of time to allow the development of markets so that the new securities could
be issued without paying a premium over market interest rates. Fourth. it could
in certain circumstances prove advantageous for the federal government or a
special agency to manage the entire debt in return for compensation. Fifth, it
would be important. to the extent possible. to manage the transfer of assets in
such a way as not to disrupt the functioning of any government enterprises.
Notes
1 For a more detailed discussion of why I consider these options to be
unlikely, see Patrick Grady, The Economic Consequences of Quebec
Sovereignty (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1991).
2 Government of Canada, Public Accounts of Canada, Volume I, Sum-
mary Report and Financial Statements (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and
Services Canada, 1990).
3 Task Force on Program Review, An Introduction to the Process of Pro-
gram Review (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, May-
1986), p. 29.
4 This interpretation is based on the legal opinions provided by two emi-
nent international legal experts to the Commission on the Political and
Constitutional Future of Quebec, Elements d'analyse economique
pertinents a la revision du statut politique et constitutionnel du Quebec,
Discussion paper no. I, first semester, 1991, pp. 518-58.
5 Jacques Parizeau, "What does sovereignty association mean?" Notes for
a speech to a joint meeting of The Empire Club of Canada and The Cana-
dian Club, Toronto, 11 December 1990, p. 10.
6 The theory assumes that it is possible to expand or contract production
at the current price (perfectly elastic supply). In this case, price increases
by the full amount of any indirect tax imposed and consumers rather than
producers bear the tax.
7 Paul Boothe and Richard Harris ("Alternative divisions of federal assets
and liabilities," a paper presented at the John Deutsch Conference on
Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change, Queen's University,
Kingston, Ontario, 4-6 June 1991) have independently proposed the simi-
lar alternative of basing the distribution on historical benefits from the
net federal spending by province. as measured by Mansell and Schlenker
("An analysis of regional distribution of federal fiscal balances: updated
data," unpublished paper, Department of Economics, University of Cal-
gary, 1990). The difference between cumulative federal net lending and
cumulative net federal spending is that the latter reflects a number of
technical adjustments and includes the interregional transfers resulting
from the regulatory aspects of federal energy policy. Conceptually, it
would be possible to extend a measure to include the impacts of tariffs
and regulatory policies in other areas such as transportation.
8 Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec, ibid.
22 The National Debt
9 Marcel Cote estimates that it would take five to ten years to develop a
market for $100 billion of new Quebec securities. Marcel COte, "Canada's
constitutional future: a viable option," a presentation to the C. D. Howe
Institute Policy Analysis Committee, Montreal, 16 November 1990, p. 3.
